Basel III capital surcharges for G-SIBs are far less effective in managing systemic risk in comparison to network-based, systemic risk-dependent financial transaction taxes
In addition to constraining bilateral exposures of financial institutions, there are essentially two options for future financial regulation of systemic risk (SR): First, financial regulation could attempt to reduce the financial fragility of global or domestic systemically important financial institutions (G-SIBs or D-SIBs), as for instance proposed in Basel III. Second, future financial regulation could attempt strengthening the financial system as a whole. This can be achieved by re-shaping the topology of financial networks.
We use an agent-based model (ABM) of a financial system and the real economy to study and compare the consequences of these two options. By conducting three “computer experiments” with the ABM we find that re-shaping financial networks is more effective and efficient than reducing leverage. Capital surcharges for G-SIBs can reduce SR, but must be larger than those specified in Basel III in order to have a measurable impact. This can cause a loss of efficiency. Basel III capital surcharges for G-SIBs can have pro-cyclical side effects.
S. Poledna, O. Bochmann, S. Thurner, Basel III capital surcharges for G-SIBs are far less effective in managing systemic risk in comparison to network-based, systemic risk-dependent financial transaction taxes, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control , Vol 77, April (2017) 230–246