Replicator dynamics of public goods games with global exclusion
Details
Here, we construct a general model of global exclusion by considering the successful construction of the centralized exclusive institution as an arbitrary non-decreasing and smooth function of the collective efforts made by the global excluders and then theoretically analyze its potential impacts in the replicator dynamics of the public goods game. Interestingly, we have shown that, despite the presence of both the first- and second-order free-riding problems, global exclusion can indeed lead to the emergence or even stabilization of public cooperation without the support of any other evolutionary mechanism.
In addition, we have also observed rich dynamical behaviors, such as the occurrence of a global or local family of neutrally stable closed orbits revolving around a nonlinear center or the existence of stable heteroclinic cycles between defectors, cooperators as well as global excluders, which give rise to a classification of up to 21 different phases.
X. Wang, M. Perc, Replicator dynamics of public goods games with global exclusion, Chaos 32 (2022) 073132